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Employment and Unemployment Statistics in Collective Bargaining: Discussion 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] This writer can't see the potential in the establishment survey data that Mills sees —at least, not 
for collective bargaining purposes. First, the sample can never be made large enough, except at 
prohibitive cost, to include a sufficient cross-section of unionized firms. Granted, union and management 
representatives have some interest in what is happening in nonunion firms; but this writer would guess 
their principal interest is in what is happening in comparable unionized relationships. Second, the 
establishment survey is a good source of information on average hourly earnings and the like, but it is 
hard to believe it provides information on wage rates and scales. Union and management officials are 
probably more interested in negotiated wage rates than in actual earnings data. Third, as far as this writer 
knows, the Establishment Survey provides absolutely no information on the multitude of other matters 
that typically concern the parties: vacation and holiday schedules, leave provisions, seniority and job 
security measures, etc. These are additional reasons why this writer believes expansion of the BLS 
collective bargaining contract series would have a bigger payoff to the parties and to researchers than the 
measures Professor Mills recommends. 
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David B. Lipsky 
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
The first objective of Quinn Mi l ls ' paper, "Employment and Unemployment 
Statistics in Collective Bargaining," was to discover whether and to what 
extent union and management officials use employment and unemployment 
statistics in their negotiations. On the basis of his interviews with 20 union and 
70 company representatives, Professor Mills concludes that ordinarily 
employment statistics are not used by the parties in collective bargaining. This 
reflects the belief of the parties (and of others) that employment and 
unemployment statistics —and the underlying labor markets conditions that 
are reflected in such statistics —have very l i t t le bearing on the outcomes of 
the bargaining process. The parties may refer to employment statistics, but 
only as a means of providing a "backdrop" for actual bargaining. 
This writer finds none of this surprising. There have been many studies of the 
criteria or standards used by the parties in negotiations, and these studies all 
point in the same direction. Levels of or changes in employment and 
unemployment —and more generally the state of the labor market —are not 
important criteria in collective negotiations. Rather the parties rely upon such 
criteria as (1) comparative wage and money settlements, (2) the employer's 
abil ity to pay, (3) the cost of living, (4) concepts to the appropriate standard of 
living, and (5) productivity changes to provide guidelines for their 
decisionmaking in negotiations. Most textbooks (including Mills') discuss the 
way these criteria are used by the parties in bargaining. 
Professor Mills asks, "Why are labor force data so l i t t le uti l ized in collective 
bargaining?" He offers three reasons: (1) such data are not available on a 
disaggregated basis, (2) the data are not " r i ch " enough, and (3) the data are 
not trusted by the parties. But these reasons miss the point. As long as the 
parties rely on criteria other than employment and unemployment to reach 
contract settlements, then no matter how disaggregated, rich, or trustworthy 
the data, the parties simply won't use them. In other words, the parties eschew 
the use of labor force statistics not because of technical data problems but 
because they attach much greater weight to other, different factors. This 
author finds it d i f f icul t to believe that the marginal changes in data collection 
and dissemination that Mills recommends can have any substantial impact on 
the parties' behavior in bargaining; accordingly such changes would not serve 
the purposes for which the commission was established. 
This writer would not object to Professor Mil ls ' suggestions: everyone favors 
better, richer, more trustworthy data. But in a world of scarce resources, 
choices mut be made on a stricter cost/benefit basis. This writer would rather 
see the money and time that Mil ls thinks should be devoted to implementing 
his recommendations be spent on improving our wage, cost of living, and 
productivity data. This writer wagers that most unions and employers would 
agree. 
For example, currently the BLS collects and publishes quarterly data on wage 
settlements and other negotiated contract provisions only for workers covered 
by "major" collective bargaining agreements (agreements covering 1,000 or 
more workers). Quarterly data on negotiated changes in total compensation 
(wages and fringes) are published only for units with 5,000 or more workers. 
There are about 180,000 contracts in effect right now, but only 1,500 or so 
cover units with 1,000 or more workers. It is true that workers under major 
contracts constitute about 50 percent of the unionized workforce. But 
obviously knowledge of the trend of settlements in large units doesn't tell us 
much about what is going on in literally thousands of smaller collective 
bargaining relationships. This writer would rather see the BLS extend its 
quarterly series on agreements to units with 100 or 200 workers than to fol low 
any of Mil ls ' suggestions. As a by-product we would also have additional 
information on the distribution of bargaining units by number of workers 
covered and —as time went on —data on changes in the number of workers 
covered by specific collective agreements. This is the kind of employment 
information employers and unions (and researchers) might f ind most useful. 
This writer can't see the potential in the establishment survey data that Mills 
sees —at least, not for collective bargaining purposes. First, the sample can 
never be made large enough, except at prohibitive cost, to include a sufficient 
cross-section of unionized firms. Granted, union and management 
representatives have some interest in what is happening in nonunion firms; but 
this writer would guess their principal interest is in what is happening in 
comparable unionized relationships. Second, the establishment survey is a 
good source of information on average hourly earnings and the like, but it is 
hard to believe it provides information on wage rates and scales. Union and 
management officials are probably more interested in negotiated wage rates 
than in actual earnings data. Third, as far as this writer knows, the 
Establishment Survey provides absolutely no information on the multitude of 
other matters that typically concern the parties: vacation and holiday 
schedules, leave provisions, seniority and job security measures, etc. These are 
additional reasons why this writer believes expansion of the BLS collective 
bargaining contract series would have a bigger payoff to the parties and to 
researchers than the measures Professor Mills recommends. 
He estimates the cost of his recommendation to be $450,000. This writer really 
has no idea how much it would cost to implement the recommendation cited 
here; it might be considerably more costly. On the other hand, since the 
system for collecting and coding contracts is already in place, extending the 
series to smaller units might not be very costly at all. Moreover, since 
collective bargaining contracts are public information, there is no problem of 
confidentiality. As an extension of this recommendation, employers and 
unions could be allowed to obtain computer printouts giving coded contract 
information for any agreement or set of agreements included in the BLS 
contract series. The cost of providing such disaggregated information can be 
paid by the parties. Finally, to reiterate, extension of the BLS contract series 
would provide useful employment information which would be keyed to the 
number of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement at the time 
it is signed. 
Addit ional thoughts are triggered by Professor Mil ls ' paper. For example, there 
is the paradox that employment measures do not seem to be important 
influences on the parties' behavior in bargaining but do seem to be important 
determinants of wages in the Phillips curve literature. It's not certain how this 
paradox can be resolved. If economic theory is correct, then employment 
measures should be important in collective negotiations. But apparently they 
are not. This writer can't help feeling that the state of the labor market does 
in fact have a significant influence on bargaining outcomes. But this influence 
doesn't manifest itself in the form of reliance by the parties on labor force 
data in negotiations. 
